Texas History on Stopping SLAPP-suits and Protecting Consumers Poor (24 States Have Laws in Place)-
The following is a summary on the poor history of TX law makers to protect consumers/taxpayers/voters from harrassing litigation by large corporate entities know as SLAPP-suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) outlawed in 24 other states:
Texas: Proposed Statutes
[Updated April 15, 2005]
Current Bill
HB 329 (as introduced)
This bill was introduced by Rep. Richard Raymond on Feb. 2, 2005. The bill provides a mechanism for dismissing "bad faith" complaints (defined as either "groundless" or brought for the purpose of harrassing or intimidating) against persons who have complained to a government (or "quasi-government") agency. It does not expressly refer to constitutionally protected expression or the right of petition. Supporters of the bill should contact Tom Blackwell.
Past Bills
A bill introduced in 1995 passed the state House of Representatives (149 - 1) but not the Senate. A new bill was introduced in 1997 by Rep. Richard Raymond (H.B. 1319). On April 14 the bill unanimously passed the House State Affairs Committee with only minor amendments. The bill was calendared for action in the House but died for lack of action because of a deluge of pending bills at the end of the regular session.
In 1999 a new anti-SLAPP bill (H.B. 2488) was introduced by State Representative Dale Tillery (D-Dallas). The bill passed in the House. It was heard at the last minute in the Senate Committee on State Affairs, whose members voted against it.
The 1999 bill was drafted and sponsored by Texas Neighborhoods Together, a statewide coalition of citywide umbrella neighborhood associations. TNT represents some 900 neighborhood associations, homeowners associations, and civic leagues. The bill was supported by, among others, the Texas Municipal League, the City of Dallas, and the Texas Trial Lawyers Association.
In 2001 the same bill was reintroduced by Rep. Tillery (H.B. 1834), but was not reported out of the House Civil Practices Committee. Another anti-SLAPP bill, H.B. 2723, passed but was vetoed by the governor on June 17, 2001.
The fifth attempt to enact an anti-SLAPP law in Texas began March 11, 2003, when Rep. Richard Raymond introduced HB 2267. The bill was passed out of the House Civil Practices Committee after public testimony but was lost in the legislature's focus on redrawing boundaries of Congressional district.
Resources
Baruch, Chad. "If I Had a Hammer: Defending Slapp Suits in Texas" 3 Texas Wesleyan Law Review 55-70 (1996).
_______________________
Comment: Stay tuned for recent updates on the Sienna residents/homeowners Fraud, Trade Deception, Harrassment, Negligence counter-suit (SLAPP-back) and recent motions by Johnson Development Co. and their Houston based international law firm Howrey LLP.
Stay informed and keep in touch!
posted by responsible_dvlpmnt at Monday, September 11, 2006
7 Comments:
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Activist Slaps Back In Countersuit Against Sienna Developer
by Bob Dunn, Feb 13, 2006, 11 03 am
Countering the defamation lawsuit filed against him by Sienna/Johnson Development, community activist Chris Calvin now accuses the developer of fraud and negligence in selling him a lot in the Sienna Plantation neighborhood.
Also named in the counterclaim, filed last week by attorney Jeffrey Singer, is Sienna/Johnson Senior Vice President Douglas Goff and three other related business entities: Sienna/Johnson North, LP; Sienna/Johnson North GP, L.L.C.; and Sienna/Johnson Development GP, L.L.C.
In the counterclaim, Calvin also accuses the defendants of deceptive trade practices and of filing a groundless lawsuit against him.
Calvin states in the claim that he and his wife bought a lot in Sienna Plantation in November of 2002, in part based on “certain representations” that included “the extent to which certain portions of the community would be used for recreational purposes. In fact, one or more of the Sienna entities have now abandoned the plan for certain recreational areas and has designated such sites for other purposes, including construction of multi-family dwellings.”
Calvin began objecting to Sienna Plantation plans for building apartments, both publicly (in Missouri City Council meetings) and on web site discussion forums. This objection, he states in his counterclaim “resulted in the filing of the plaintiff’s petition in this case against him.”
Sienna/Johnson and Goff filed suit against Calvin and an associated organization, the Committee for Responsible Development, in December, accusing him of defamation, business disparagement, public nuisance and “tortuous interference with prospective contract.”
The suit also seeks a permanent injunction to prevent Calvin and his organization “from making any statements under any pseudonyms” regarding the developers or their affiliates.
Calvin has characterized Sienna/Johnson’s actions as typical of a SLAPP suit strategy – a legal tactic in which a business entity tries to blunt criticism by burdening opponents with the cost of a legal defense. . .
For JK and assoc.:
Consultation fees
A lawyer's dog, running around town unleashed, heads for a butcher shop and steals a roast. The butcher goes to the lawyer's office and asks, "if a dog running unleashed steals a piece of meat from my store, do I have a right to demand payment for the meat from the dog's owner?" The lawyer answers, "Absolutely."
"Then you owe me $8.50. Your dog was loose and stole a roast from me today."
The lawyer, without a word, writes the butcher a check for $8.50. The butcher, having a feeling of satisfaction, leaves.
Three days later, the butcher finds a bill from the lawyer: $100 due for a consultation.
Here's some more from Baruch:
http://www.jtexconsumerlaw.com/V8N1pdf/V8N1slapp.pdf.
Journal of Texas Consumer Law
36
Defending
Consumers
From Retaliatory
Litigation
here is a new trend in American consumer litigation that presents a
“pernicious and unacceptable threat” to American liberty.
1
In
growing numbers, consumers and consumer
activists who communicate with government of? cials ? nd themselves facing
retaliatory lawsuits. These lawsuits are known as “Strategic
By Chad Baruch
*
“SLAPP”-ed Around
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” or “SLAPPs.”
2
Consumer activity often involves lobbying or requesting assistance from
government of? cials, as well as litigation. Some of these consumers are af?
liated with watchdog groups, but the vast majority are individuals acting on
their own. Whether lobbying or litigating, consumers are discovering that
activism is rewarded with costly and protracted retaliatory litigation.
Part I of this article describes the elements of a SLAPP, part II analyzes
the constitutional issues implicated by SLAPPs, and part III offers
practitioners advice on defending their clients from retaliatory lawsuits.
I.
Recognizing the SLAPP
Recognition is the key to successfully defending against a SLAPP. The goal
of this litigation is intimidation. If the party defending the SLAPP is
forced to expend signi? cant time and resources then the suit was a success.
Early action is essential, and early action necessitates early recognition.
To recognize a SLAPP, an attorney must ? rst set aside traditional notions
of the lawsuit’s subject matter. SLAPPs, after all, do not come with a
warning label – they are camou? aged, most frequently as claims for
defamation or interference with contract. Rather than treating the claim as
one for defamation or interference with contract, the attorney must
recognize that the claim actually is a SLAPP.
While de? ning a SLAPP may not be a matter of absolute precision, most
SLAPPs share common characteristics. As a general matter, a SLAPP is:
(1)
A civil complaint or counterclaim;
(2)
Filed against non-government individuals or organizations;
(3)
Alleging injuries from their communications to in? uence government actions
(communications to government of? cials);
(4)
On an issue of some public interest or importance.
3
Journal of Texas Consumer Law
37
Consumer SLAPP claims arise in different contexts.
A consumer or activist who complains to government of? cials about a company
or industry may end up defending a SLAPP suit. Additionally, SLAPP claims
frequently are asserted as counterclaims in pending actions brought by
consumers. In either case, the most common SLAPP claims are defamation
(including libel and slander), interference with contract, abuse of process,
and conspiracy.
Although many different types of consumer disputes may result in the
assertion of SLAPP claims, a fairly typical case is Bass v. Rohr.
4
In that case, a homeowner hired a
licensed home improvement contractor to perform residential renovations.
5
When disputes arose about the work and
charges, the consumer ? led a complaint with the Maryland Home Improvement
Commission.
6
The commission declined
to initiate charges against the contractor for violations of Maryland’s home
improvement laws, instead believing the matter was a civil dispute.
7
The contractor then sued
the consumer for defamation, basing that claim upon the consumer’s written
communications with the commission.
8
The defamation claim – a classic SLAPP – was eventually dismissed based upon
the petition right.
9
Bass presents an excellent example of a consumer who seeks help from the
appropriate governmental body, only to be sued for those communications.
Among the many other types of consumer transactions that have led to SLAPP
claims are furniture sales, 10 securities investments,
11
real estate development,
12
mobile home park management agreements,
13
retirement
community memberships, and cemetery plot purchases.
14
II.
Defending the SLAPP – Strategy
Once the SLAPP is recognized, the next step is obtaining its early
dismissal. This necessitates focusing on the political and constitutional
issues engendered by SLAPP claims. Too often, attorneys are so focused on
defending the “convenience heading” of the SLAPP that they miss the larger
societal issues. By the time they realize this error, their client has
expended enormous sums of money in defense of the claims.
It is essential to defense of a SLAPP claim not only to treat it as a SLAPP,
but to call it a SLAPP. The level of media and political attention focused
on SLAPP claims over the past decade virtually ensures that judges are
familiar with the concept and have formed a dim view of it. Attaching the
SLAPP label – where it is warranted – may give consumer clients an immediate
rhetorical advantage. It may also cause the judge to expect and receive
favorably a dispositive motion based upon the First Amendment.
Since the goal of most SLAPP claims is intimidation and expense, dispositive
motions should be ? led as early in the litigation as possible. Many states
now have anti-SLAPP all the goals of the SLAPP! It is, in fact, no
settlement at all other than an admission that the SLAPP did precisely what
it was supposed to do – force the consumer to cease activity. A better
approach is to pursue the summary judgment motion to its conclusion.
III.
Defending the SLAPP - Substance
A.
The United States Constitution
The Petition Clause of the United States Constitution provides in relevant
part that “Congress shall make no law .
. . abridging the freedom … to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.
16
There, in astonishingly succinct
fashion, is encapsulated the most seminal right of a free people to petition
their government. The Petition Clause, other constitutional guarantees, and
the entire American political ethos encourage, promote, and purport to
protect citizens who testify, debate, lobby, write, petition, and appeal to
their government.
The right to petition the government is the wellspring of American political
rights:
Its roots run deep in many cultures. It appears in the earliest English laws
of more than 1,000 years ago. In 1215, in a ? eld called Runnymede, it gave
birth to the Magna Carta. By the seventeenth century, it was a ? rm ? xture
in English law. It was vigorously asserted in our American colonies a full
decade before the Revolution, ? gured prominently in the Declaration of
Independence, and appeared in eight state constitutions even before the Bill
of Rights added it to the U.S.
Constitution in 1791. Some admirers even claim that it is the “original”
political right.
17
The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is “among the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.”
18
It shares the preferred
place accorded in our system of government to other First Amendment freedoms
and “has a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”
19
In fact, the right to petition
the government is necessarily implicit in and fundamental to the very notion
of American democracy.
20
The scope of the Petition Clause was initially addressed by the U.S. Supreme
Court under what is known as the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, based upon the
Court’s antitrust decisions in Eastern Rail Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. and United Mine Workers v. Pennington.
22
The Noerr case involved a dispute between railroads and trucking companies
for control of freight hauling business.
23
The railroads launched advertising and lobbying campaigns, and the truckers
sued alleging antitrust violations.
24
The Court held attempts to solicit government action could not give rise to
antitrust liability:
Once the
SLAPP is
recognized,
the next step
is obtaining
its early
dismissal.
laws providing special procedures for dismissal or summary adjudication of
SLAPP claims.
15
Texas,
unfortunately, has yet to enact anti-SLAPP legislation. The most expeditious
means for eliminating a SLAPP claim in Texas is to seek traditional summary
judgment on the basis of the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.
A summary judgment motion may be met
with an offer of settlement. The party maintaining the SLAPP claims may
offer to dismiss them in exchange for an agreement not to pursue whatever
communication or activity precipitated the SLAPP.
This is a settlement, of course, that accomplishes In a representative
democracy such as this, these branches of government act on behalf of the
people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept of representation
depends upon the ability of the people to make their wishes known to their
representatives.
25
Five years later, the Court decided
Pennington, holding that “joint efforts to in? uence public of? cials do not
violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate competition.”
26
Journal of Texas Consumer Law
38
Though the concepts underlying the doctrine appeared to apply to all
petition claims, the Court made clear that the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine was
limited to antitrust cases. The interplay between the Petition Clause and
First Amendment doctrines in other areas of the law remained the source of
signi? cant confusion. In 1985, however, the Court held that a citizen may
not be sued for defamatory statements made in the context of a government
petition without proof of malice.
27
The court’s holding adopted the test established in the free press arena in
New York Times v. Sullivan.
28
In 1991, the Court extended the scope of the Noerr- Pennington Doctrine in
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., a classic antitrust
SLAPP involving two outdoor advertising companies.
29
Newcomer Omni was
Properly
understood, the
Texas Constitution
protects virtually
all consumer
communications
with government
of?cials.
attempting to gain a foothold in the Columbia market.
30
To forestall Omni’s efforts, competitor COA successfully lobbied the city
to adopt rezoning ordinances that effectively destroyed Omni’s ability to
compete.
31
Omni sued COA and the city
claiming that COA’s petitioning was a “sham” designed to interfere with
Omni’s business.
32
A jury awarded Omni $2.2
million in damages.
33
The Supreme Court reversed the award,
holding that the case should have been dismissed on Petition Clause grounds.
Omni dramatically strengthens the Petition Clause by holding that it shields
an effort “to in? uence public of? cials regardless of intent or purpose.”
34
After Omni, the test
for protection in the antitrust arena is clear: if the petitioning was aimed
at procuring governmental action, it is protected and any claim arising from
it should be should be dismissed – without respect to other motives or
purposes. Under Omni, then, communications to government of? cials are
protected from antitrust liability in all cases except where they are not
genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action.
This principle is sometimes termed the “Sham Doctrine.”
35
The Court has yet to apply the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, and particularly
its recent enunciation in Omni, to other types of cases. At the same time, a
strong argument exists that the Sham Doctrine makes more sense under
non-antitrust Petition Clause cases than the actual malice standard. There
is little rational basis for the existence of a different test for petition
rights in the antitrust arena, as the nature of the political right being
asserted is no different than in other cases. Moreover, the actual malice
standard does not suf? ciently protect the petition right from coercion:
[T]he malice standard invites intimidation of all who seek redress from the
government; malice is easy to allege under modern pleading rules . . . and
therefore in most cases even those who acted without malice would be put to
the burden and expense of defending a lawsuit. Thus, the malice standard
does not supply the “breathing space” that First Amendment freedoms need to
survive.
36
At a minimum, then, SLAPP
?lers in consumer cases must prove that
the communications complained of were
undertaken with actual malice – a standard that most SLAPP claimants will be
unable to meet. Attorneys defending consumer SLAPP claims must attack those
claims using the actual malice standard and, in the absence of evidence
establishing malice, summary judgment under the U.S.
Constitution is appropriate. Additionally, attorneys representing consumers
should also argue forcefully that the Sham Doctrine should be expanded to
govern all cases arising under the Petition Clause.
37
B.
The Texas Constitution
The Texas Constitution provides even greater protection of the petition
right than federal provisions.
The Petition Clause of the Texas Constitution provides that “citizens shall
have the right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together for their common
good; and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress
of grievances or other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance.”
38
When interpreting the Texas Constitution, Texas courts are not bound by the
decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court, so long as the U.S. Constitution is not offended.
39
Under our federal system, states are free to reject federal holdings so
long as minimum federal constitutional standards are met, 40 and the
Supreme Court has long stressed the important role of independent state
constitutional jurisprudence in our federal scheme.
41
Thus, the protections
of the Texas Constitution may exceed those of the federal constitution even
though the phrasing of a guarantee is the same or similar in both charters.
Texas law zealously guards the petition right. Under Texas law, “a citizen’s
right to approach an elected of? cial or body cannot be abridged.”
42
The petition right, at least in
Texas, means at a minimum that “[e]very communication is privileged which is
made in good faith with a view to obtain redress for some injury or to
prevent some public abuse.”
43
Where statements in a communication to government of? cials are alleged to
be actionable, it must ? rst be proved that the statements at issue “were
made in bad faith and for reasons other than to obtain action on a valid
grievance.”
44
Texas law appears to be ahead of federal jurisprudence is applying what is
essentially the Omni standard to all cases under the Petition Clause. There
appears to be little distinction in practice between the Sham Doctrine,
which protects communications so long as they are genuinely aimed at
procuring favorable government action, and the Texas rule protecting all
communications except those made in bad faith and for reasons other than to
obtain favorable governmental action.
Properly understood, the Texas Constitution protects virtually all consumer
communications with government of? cials. The standard that SLAPP ? lers
must meet to overcome that protection is exceptionally high – they must
prove that the consumer’s communications with the government were in bad
faith and made for some reason other than to obtain favorable governmental
action.
C.
“SLAPP”-ing Back
SLAPP targets in other
states have successfully countersued
and obtained signi? cant verdicts
against SLAPP ? lers in what are
sometimes called SLAPPBACK
suits.
45
In addition to lacking
anti-SLAPP legislation, Texas also
limits the types of claims used in
SLAPPBACKs – usually malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, or
negligent in? iction of emotional
distress. These claims are either
not available or are severely limited
in Texas.
46
Journal of Texas Consumer Law
39
Of course, Texas law does afford a remedy to aggrieved SLAPP targets in the
form of sanctions for groundless claims.
Chapters 9 and 10 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permit the
imposition of sanctions for the ? ling of frivolous pleadings.
47
Similarly, Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial
court to impose sanctions for pleadings that are either groundless and
brought in bad faith, or groundless and brought for the purpose of
harassment.
48
Attorneys representing SLAPP targets who prevail in summary judgment motions
on constitutional grounds should give serious consideration to seeking
sanctions on behalf of their clients. In addition to the potential for
clients to recoup their litigation expenses, the consistent imposition of
sanctions against SLAPP ? iers may operate as a deterrent to the ? ling of
such claims.
IV.
Conclusion
The threats presented by SLAPP claims are real and serious. “Short of a gun
to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be
imagined.”
49
As
a result, Texas practitioners and judges must be especially vigilant in
asserting and protecting the constitutional petition rights of consumers.
The alternative would be to undermine the very fabric of American society:
We shudder to think of the chill . . . were we to allow this lawsuit to
proceed. The cost to society in terms of the threat to our liberty and
freedom is beyond calculation . . . . To prohibit robust debate on these
questions would deprive society of the bene? t of its collective thinking
and . . . destroy the free exchange of ideas which is the adhesive of our
democracy.
50
*
J.D., University of Minnesota Law School. Chad Baruch is an attorney in
Rowlett, Texas, and is the Assistant Principal of Yavneh Academy of Dallas,
an Orthodox Jewish college preparatory high school. He is the Treasurer of
the Consumer Law Section of the State Bar of Texas prevent further
litigation and communications. The appellate court reversed on the basis of
the petition right.
14. For a discussion of these cases and others, see G EORGE W. P RING
& P
ENELOPE
C
ANAN
, SLAPPS: G
ETTING
S
UED
FOR
S
PEAKING
O
UT
130-
134 (1996). This book is the de? nitive work on SLAPPs, and is an invaluable
resource for any attorney defending a SLAPP claim.
15. See, e.g.,H
AW
R
EV
. S
TAT
.§ 634F-2 (2002); I
ND
. C
ODE
§ 34-7-7-9 (1998); L
A
. C
ODE
C
IV
. P
ROC
. A
NN
. art. 971 (West 2004);
M
E
. R
EV
. S
TAT
. A
NN
. tit. 14, § 556 (West 2004).
16. U.S. C
ONST
. amend. I.
17. P
RING
& C
ANAN
, supra note 4, at 15-16 (citations omitted).
18. United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n,
389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967).
19. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
20. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875).
21. Eastern Rail Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
22. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
23. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 128-29.
24. Id. at 129-30.
25. Id. at 137.
26. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 670.
27. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
28. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S.
365 (1991).
30. Id. at 368.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 369.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 380 (citation omitted).
35. Eastern Rail Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,
365 U.S. 127, 144.
36. Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Supp. 934, 938 (D. Cal. 1972).
37. The unanimity of the court in the portion of the Omni decision
addressing petition rights suggests the reasonable possibility that the
Court may at some point expand it beyond the sphere of antitrust law.
38. T
EX
. C
ONST
. art. I, § 27.
39. Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
40. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
41. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 735 (1984) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Minnesota v. Nat ’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940).
42. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist. V. Padilla, 709 S.W.2d 700, 704
(Tex.App. – Corpus Christi 1986, no writ).
43. Connellee v. Blanton, 163 S.W. 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.
– Fort Worth 1913, no writ); see also Aransas Harbor Terminal Ry. Co.
v. Taber, 235 S.W. 841 (Tex. 1921) (citing Connellee favorably in petition
case).
44. Wood v. State, 577 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), overruled on
other grounds by Hankins v. State, 646 S.W.2d 191 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981).
45. See, e.g., Leonardini v. Shell Oil Co., 264 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1989); see also George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, “Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” (“SLAPPS”): An Introduction for
Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12 B RIDGE . L. R EV . 937,
955-57 (1992).
46. Texas does not recognize any claim for negligent in? iction of
emotional distress. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
Claims for malicious prosecution are recognized, but disfavored. See, e.g.,
Browning-Ferris Indus. V. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.
1994).
47. T
EX
. C
IV
. P
RAC
. & R
EM
. C
ODE
A
NN
.§§ 9.001-9.014, 10.001-10.006
(Vernon 2002).
48. T
EX
. R. C
IV
. P. 13 (West 2004).
49. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (Sup. Ct.1992), aff’d, 616
N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1994).
50. Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 43 (W. Va. 1981).
1. See Ralph Michael Stein, SLAPP Suits: A Slap at the First Amendment, 7 P
ACE E NVTL . L. R EV
.45 (1989).
2. The term was apparently coined by George W. Pring and Penelope Canan of
the University of Denver to describe what they call a “new breed of lawsuits
stalking America.” Alexandra Dyan Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A.
J., Sept. 1996, at 48.
3. G
EORGE
W. P
RING
& P
ENELOPE
C
ANAN
, “SLAPPs” –“Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation” in Government Diagnosis and Treatment
of the Newest Civil Rights Abuse, 9 C IVIL R IGHTS L ITIGATION
& A
TTORNEY
’
S
F
EE
A
NNOTATED
H
ANDBOOK
359 359-360 (Clark, et al.
eds., 1993).
4. Bass v. Rohr,471 A.2d 752 (Md. 1984).
5. Id. at 753.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 754-55.
8. Id. at 755.
9. Id.
10. Behr v. Weber, 568 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). In Behr, a
consumer activist faced a SLAPP suit arising from activities including
writing to the Suffolk County Department of Consumer Affairs to complain
about a furniture manufacturing company.
11. Havoco of America, Ltd. V. Hollowbow, 702 F.2d 643 (7th Cir.
1983).
12. Great Western Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Sup. 827 (N.D. Ill.
1979), aff’d mem., 614 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1979).
13. Smith v. Silvey, 197 Cal. Rptr. 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). In Smith, a
mobile home park resident lodged repeated complaints with various government
of? cials alleging criminal or regulatory violations at the park (at least
some of which were apparently true, and resulted in issuance of citations or
criminal charges), and also ? led suit against the park. The owner of the
park sued and obtained an injunction to
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